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is paper introduces a game theoretical semantics for a particular logic of
formal inconsistency, called mbC.
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1 Motivation
Paraconsistent logics are the logics of inconsistencies. ey are designed to reason
about and with inconsistencies, and generate formal systems which do not get triv-
ialized under the presence of inconsistencies. Formally, a logic is paraconsistent if
the explosion principle does not hold - in paraconsistent systems, there exist some
formulas φ,ψ such that φ,¬φ 0 ψ .
Within the broad class of paraconsistent logics, Logics of Formal Inconsistency
(LFIs, for short) present an original take on inconsistencies. Similar to the da Costa
systems, LFIs form a large class of paraconsistent logics and make use of a special op-
erator to control inconsistencies (da Costa et al., 2007; Carnielli et al., 2007). Another
interesting property of LFIs is that they internalize consistency and inconsistency at
the object level. To date, the semantics for LFIs have been suggested using truth tables
and algebraic structures. What we aim for in this paper is to present a game theoret-
ical semantics for a particular logic within the class of LFIs. By achieving this, we
aempt at both presenting a wider perspective for the semantics of paraconsistency
and a broader, more nuanced understanding of semantic games.
∗can@canbaskent.net canbaskent.net/logic
†phcarrasqueira@gmail.com
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Game theoretical semantics uses game theoretical tools and methods to give mean-
ing to logical formulas. It introduces notions like strategies and wins to logic. Histor-
ically, its roots can be traced back to Lorenz and Lorenzen, yet the modern revival of
this approach is mostly due to Hintikka and the Helsinki school (Hintikka & Sandu,
1997; Hodges, 2013).
A verication game for a formula φ in a model M checks whether φ is satised
in M . e verication is achieved by playing an intuitive game. In the classical case,
the semantic verication game for classical logic is played by two players, the verier
and the falsier. e verier’s goal is to verify the truth of a given formula in a given
model. Dually, the falsier’s goal is to falsify it. e rules of the game are specied
syntactically based on the current roles of the players. In the game, the given formula
is broken into subformulas step by step by the players. A specic instance of the game,
a play, terminates when it reaches the propositional variables and when there is no
move to make. If the play ends with a propositional literal which is true in the model
in question, then the current verier wins the game. Otherwise, the (current) falsier
wins. In classical logic, we associate conjunction with the falsier, disjunction with
the verier. at is, when the main connective is a conjunction, it is the (current)
falsier’s turn to choose and make a move, and similarly, disjunction yields a choice
for the verier. Additionally, in classical logic, negation switches the (current) roles
of the players: the player whose role is currently the verier admits the role of the
falsier and the player whose role is currently the falsier admits the role of the ver-
ier. e major result of this approach states that the verier has a winning strategy
in the verication game if and only if the given formula is true in the given model.
Similarly, the falsier is said to have a winning strategy if and only if the formula is
false in the model. is result is called the correctness theorem for game theoretical
semantics for classical logic.
Notice that the semantic games in classical logic are very limited game theoreti-
cally. ey are zero-sum (when one player wins, the other loses), determined (every
game has a player admiing a winning strategy), sequential (only one player makes
a move at any time), non-cooperative (players compete against each other) and per-
fect information (the rules and the game board are fully known). A recent research
program, paraconsistent game theory, studies the connection between the aforemen-
tioned game theoretical conditions and corresponding logical properties in the con-
text of paraconsistent logics (Bas¸kent, 2015; Bas¸kent, 2016; Bas¸kent, 2017). Which
logical rules force determinism in games? Which logics require two-players? Which
semantic conditions require non-sequential play? How can we represent the infec-
tious truth-values of logics of non-sense in game semantics? So far, this methodology
has been applied to a very limited set of non-classical logics. Overall goal of this re-
search program can be viewed in parallel to the program of logical pluralism (Beall
& Restall, 2006; Priest, 2013). As logical pluralism suggests the ontological possibil-
ity of a broader logical toolkit, paraconsistent game theory aims at developing game
theoretical pluralism where alternative formalisms for games with inconsistencies are
suggested. is oen requires “stretching and relaxing” certain game theoretical con-
cepts, just as non-classical logics helped us to redene negation both conceptually and
formally. As such, the current paper aempts at expanding the domain of semantics
games for paraconsistent logics by introducing a new semantics for a particular LFI.
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Specically, in this paper we ask the following questions. How can we give a game
theoretical semantics for LFIs? More importantly, following the Hintikkan method-
ology, what are the game theoretical properties of the verication games for LFIs?
By discussing these questions, we will shed light on the connection between LFIs and
games. Furthermore, games will provide a somewhat natural explanation for the com-
plicated semantical structure of LFIs, providing an alternative approach. Answering
these questions for all LFIs is practically impossible in a single research paper. For
that reason, in this paper we discuss a foundational system, called mbC, within the
family of LFIs.
e organization of the paper is as follows. First, we introduce mbC - the formal
system we focus on, which is followed by a discussion of its semantics. Following,
we propose a game theoretical semantics and a set of rules for such a game for mbC.
We illustrate some applications of semantic games for mbC, and show the correctness
of our game semantics. Before suggesting some possible extensions and alternatives
of mbC games, we also present a pragmatic discussion of game semantics with an
emphasis on game semantics for mbC. Finally, we conclude with some suggestions
for future work. roughout the text, when we write game semantics, we mean game
theoretical semantics.
2 Logics of Formal Inconsistency andmbC
LFIs extend da Costa systems and generate a broad class of paraconsistent logics
(da Costa et al., 2007; Carnielli et al., 2007). In this work, we focus on a particular LFI,
called mbC. e system mbC exhibits some of the most important aspects of LFIs. It is
“strong enough to contain the germ of classical negation, possessing a kind of hidden
classical negation” and contains a consistency operator (Carnielli & Coniglo, 2016).
Let us start with dening the language L of mbC. Given a set of propositional
variables P , we dene the syntax of mbC in the Backus-Naur form as follows, where
p ∈ P .
φ ::= p | ¬φ | ◦φ | φ ∧ φ | φ ∨ φ | φ → φ
What distinguishes mbC and other LFIs from other paraconsistent logics is their
use of the consistency operator ◦. e consistency operator simply checks whether
a formula explodes. is allows us to distinguish and control the formulas that can
explode the model.
A model M for mbC is a tuple M = (S,V ) where S is a non-empty set andV : L 7→
{T , F } is a valuation function. e function V for mbC assigns a unique truth value
to propositional variables, and satises the following conditions (Carnielli & Coniglo,
2016):
• V (¬φ) = F then V (φ) = T ,
• V (◦φ) = T then V (φ) = F or V (¬φ) = F ,
• V (φ → ψ ) = T if and only if V (φ) = F or V (ψ ) = T ,
• V (φ ∧ψ ) = T if and only if V (φ) = T and V (ψ ) = T ,
• V (φ ∨ψ ) = T if and only if V (φ) = T or V (ψ ) = T .
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In this semantics, the truth values of ¬φ and ◦φ are not necessarily determined by
the truth value of φ. at is, for instance, if V (φ) = T , then V (¬φ) is not determined
with respect to V (φ). It can be either T or F , but not both nor neither. erefore, the
valuation function V is functional, but not truth-functional: mbC valuations are, just
as classical valuations, simple functions, but mbC logical operations themselves are
not functions from tuples of truth values to truth values, but multifunctions instead
(Carnielli et al., 2007). ey assign to the given tuple of truth values a set of possi-
ble truth values, from which an mbC valuation is then to pick one for the value of
the corresponding complex formula. is valuation is sometimes called bivaluation.
e semantics for mbC is in sharp contrast to semantics for other paraconsistent log-
ics such as Asenjo’s and Priest’s LP, which drops the assumption that valuations are
functional but keeps classical logical operations essentially intact.
is valuation gives rise to a sound and complete semantics for mbC. We refer the
reader to (Carnielli & Coniglo, 2016) for a proof.1 We give the non-deterministic truth
table for some formulas in mbC in Figure 1.
p ¬p ◦p p ∧ ¬p
T T F T
F T FF F
F T T FF F
Figure 1: Truth table for some formulas in mbC.
Non-determinacy is one of the complications of mbC and LFIs in general. Next,
compared to classical propositional logic, mbC has an extended language with the
consistency operator – if a formula and its negation are both true, then the consis-
tency of the formula must be false. Second, perhaps semantically more importantly,
mbC assumes that a formula and its negation are subcontraries, but not necessarily
contraries. at is they cannot both be false under the same valuation, but they can
both be true under the same valuation. It therefore becomes a meaningful question
to ask how these complications can be handled using game semantics.
e logic mbC is axiomatized by the following set of axioms.
• φ → (ψ → φ)
• (φ → (ψ → χ )) → ((φ → ψ ) → (φ → χ ))
• φ → (ψ → (φ ∧ψ ))
• φ ∧ψ → φ
• φ ∧ψ → ψ
1As suspected by one of the anonymous referees, the logic mbC does not admit a trivial model — there
is no valuation V such that V (φ ) = T for all formula φ (Carnielli & Coniglo, 2016). If there was one, it
would entail that ◦φ be false, which can be seen from the truth table of mbC in Figure 1.
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• φ → φ ∨ψ
• ψ → φ ∨ψ
• (φ → ψ ) → ((ψ → χ ) → ((φ ∨ χ ) → χ )
• (φ → ψ ) ∨ φ
• φ ∨ ¬φ
• ◦φ → (φ → (¬φ → ψ ))
e rule of inference is modus ponens: φ,φ → ψ ∴ ψ .
e last axiom summarizes how mbC controls the inconsistencies, whereas all
the other axioms are classical. It simply says that only classically-behaved formulas
(which satisfy ◦φ) can explode and trivialize the theory. is axiom is called the gentle
explosion law in (Carnielli & Coniglo, 2016) as it weakens the principle of explosion.2
e logic mbC can be viewed as the starting point for the study of paraconsistent
negation, which is also crucial in the game theoretical analysis of non-classical log-
ics. e logic mbC is the minimal paraconsistent logic based on classical logic with
the basic property of consistency (hence its name) (Carnielli & Coniglo, 2016). ere-
fore, the study of mbC and of stronger LFIs based on it are of theoretical interest,
as a means toward a deeper understanding of negation and consistency, which has
direct relevance not only to paraconsistency but also to intermediate logics and intu-
itionism. Additionally, as games are used to model interactive and rational situations,
game semantics for mbC gives the logic a discussive and argumentative context. is
context relates game semantics and paraconsistency to pragmatism. Furthermore, a
game theoretical approach to mbC, and in general to non-classical logics, postulates a
broader theory of (game theoretical) rationality. How rational agents make moves in
semantic games for mbC? Can there exist game theoretical situations similar to mbC
semantic games? For a deeper understanding of such issues, a discussion of game
semantics for mbC is an essential rst step. is is what we achieve in the following.
In this work, we focus on mbC as it is a simple yet powerful logic within the
family of LFIs. For our purposes, mbC is an ideal candidate. Its semantics is rather
dierent from the various other non-classical logics as it resorts to bivaluations. It
has a special operator to express the meta-logical concept of consistency at the object
level. From a practical perspective, mbC is also a well-studied example of LFIs, and
relates directly to many other non-classical logics – including fuzzy, intuitionistic and
minimal logics. Furthermore, mbC, along side with many other LFIs, interacts with
the classical propositional logic in an interesting way. As underlined by Carnielli
and Coniglio, mbC is both a subsystem and an extension of classical logic (Carnielli
& Coniglo, 2016). is allows us to discuss the nuances of game semantics, which
was initially suggested for classical logic, in a broader formal framework. It is also
important to note thatmbC is a propositional system. Focusing on the game semantics
of mbC, therefore, generates a fruitful project with the potential of expanding it to
2As we mentioned earlier, the lack of the principle of explosion is a dening property for paraconsistent
logics. In LFIs, on the other hand, the explosion is “gentle” and fails only for certain formulas.
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the modal and rst-order extensions of mbC. is is how we justify our choice for
mbC.
So far is the basics of mbC. In what follows, we present a game semantics for
mbC.
3 Gameeoretical Semantics formbC
e game semantics for mbC faces two immediate challenges. e rst challenge is
to give a game theoretical interpretation for the consistency operator ◦. e second
one is to design a semantic game with semantic non-determinism in the sense that
the negation of a true formula can be either true or false non-deterministically.
An interesting aspect of game semantics is that it is not compositional. A composi-
tional semantics is a system where the truth value of complex formulas is determined
based on the truth value of their subformulas. Algebraic semantics and truth-tables
oer compositional semantics. In semantic games, however, players make choices
without testing the alternatives. e truth value of the formula, thus, depends only
on the choices made, not in addition to the choices not made.
Game semantics for mbC requires a relaxation of the non-compositionality prin-
ciple. As we mentioned earlier, the ◦ operator internalizes the meta logical concept of
consistency at the object level in the logic, and it is eectively a consistency-checker.
In order to give a game theoretical semantics for the behavior of the ◦ operator, the
truth values of both a formula and its negation need to be considered at the same time
(see Table 1). is will generate two subgames for both possible choices. We will use
this observation when we discuss the game rules for the ◦ operator.
On the other hand, our approach to non-determinism is similar to the non-deterministic
choices in the dynamic logic of programing (Harel et al., 2000). In the propositional
dynamic logical syntax, the formula [a ∪ b]p means that aer a non-deterministic
run of programs a or b, the proposition p holds. In this case, it remains as a non-
deterministic choice which program is run. In propositional dynamic logic, for the
expression [a ∪ b]p, where a,b are programs and p is a proposition, we have the fol-
lowing equivalence:
[a ∪ b]p ≡ [a]p ∧ [b]p
at is ifp is the output of a non-deterministic run of programsa andb, this means that
both programs, independent from each other, should produce the output p. erefore,
from a computational point of view, a non-deterministic run reduces to two dierent
programs, a and b in this case, running with the same input and producing the same
output. In a non-deterministic choice, both choices should be ensured to produce the
same output - simply because it is not determined which program will be executed.
Notice that this is not just an epistemic ambiguity, it is non-determinism.
We adopt a similar approach in this work. In a game, using the logical vocabulary,
if a player can non-deterministically win a game, this amounts to the fact that he has
individual wins in each non-deterministic choice.3 His strategy must work in both
cases.
3As one of the anonymous referees observed, our computational reading of non-determinacy is rather
dierent than the standard notion of non-deterministic wins in game theory. Our semantic games do not
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is point underlines our philosophical motivation. We classify our philosoph-
ical motivation into two main categories: (semantic) non-determinism of truth and
constant-sum semantic games. Non-determinism of truth is formally complex and
it gets more complicated within the context of paraconsistency. More importantly,
use of game semantics in understanding non-determinism in paraconsistency directly
relates to the historical roots of paraconsistency. Jas´kovski’s discursive logic, sug-
gested in 1948, postulates and motivates paraconsistency within an interactive dis-
cussive context (Jas´kowski, 1999). In his suggestion, paraconsistency is viewed as
an inconsistency within the beliefs and opinions of the discussants. e key point
of Jas´kovski’s approach is to motivate it in an implicit multi-agent context. In such
context, non-determinism is a natural paradigm: participants (discussants, agents,
players) may assert p without having any opinion about ¬p. What is the logic of
such situations? Particularly, what is the paraconsistent logic of such interactive non-
determinism? Game semantics for LFIs suggests an answer to this question by re-
maining loyal to the Jas´kovskian roots of paraconsistency. Such a discussion on the
discussive roots of paraconsistency relates the subject to pragmatism as well, which
we discuss later on in detail.
Second, semantic games oen enjoy simple game theoretical properties, as we un-
derlined earlier. A philosophical contribution to this debate should start with classify-
ing the semantic games for dierent logics: which semantics games for which logics
are constant sum? Conversely, semantic games suggest new tools to “develop” logical
systems with the desired properties for constant-sum games. Our work presents a
rst step towards this direction.
Now, we start by describing the semantic games formbC. First of all, the gameG is
played by two players: the verier (V) and the falsier (F). In the literature, sometimes
these players are calledHeloise andAbelard orme andNature, respectively. We denote
the set of players by Π.
e game G is played on a model M = (S,V ) where S is a non-empty set and
V : P 7→ ℘(S ) is a valuation function dened on the set of propositional variables P
and extended to all the formulas inL in the standard way. e model can be viewed as
the game-board or the arena of the verication game. A given formula φ is evaluated
in the model M by playing a game to see whether M |= φ or not.
We allow the set of positions Σ vary over the language: Σ ⊆ {(pi ,φ) : pi ∈ Π,φ ∈
L}. e set Σ is precisely determined based on the given formula, players’ roles,
underlying logic and the game rules. e algorithm which is used to determine Σ in
classical game semantics works in our case as well. Hence, we will not worry about
the details of this procedure here.
A (pure) strategy for player i is a set of rules that tells him which move to make at
each position where it is his turn. A winning strategy for i is the one that guarantees
a win for i regardless of the moves of the opponent(s).4 e correctness theorem of
contain any probabilistic choice at all. Our reading of non-determinism is rather similar to that of non-
determinism in automata theory.
4As one of the anonymous referees underlined, this is a critical denition. Winning strategies are (tradi-
tionally) dened for win/lose games. Otherwise, the standard terminology is “strategy guaranteeing max-
imal payo”. But, this is problematic as well especially within the context of (classical) game semantics,
where there is no (ordinal or otherwise) payo. Keeping these points in mind, we choose to use the tradi-
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game semantics postulates how the existence of winning strategies relates to the truth
of the formula in question in semantic games. However, in general, it is very much
possible to have semantic games that are not win/lose. In that case, we may have
games where one player’s win may not amount to the opponent’s loss.5
e winning conditions for mbC games expand those for the semantic games for
classical logic. e current verier wins G if the game ends with a propositional
variable which is true in the model and there is no more move to make. Dually, the
current falsier wins if the game ends with a propositional variable which is false in
the model and there is no more move to make.6
In game semantics for mbC, we allow players to have multiple roles in terms of
being veriers or falsiers. Let us then introduce some notation for clarity. By Xx,
we denote the situation where player X has the role x. e player X varies over Π
by denition, and similarly the role x can be either v or f which stand for the verier
and falsier, respectively. In particular, Vv,f denotes the cases where player V’s role is
undetermined. In this case, due to our reading of non-determinacy which we explained
earlier, the player V assumes both roles - his strategy must work in either case. For
simplicity of notation, when players assume their default roles, we will not specify it
with a subscript. We will refer to this notation especially when we discuss negation
and the associated game rule, where players switch roles.
Similar to game semantics for some other non-classical logics, the game semantics
for mbC requires some changes in the standard verication game (Bas¸kent, 2015). e
change we propose is to have a constant sum semantic verication game, reecting
the non-deterministic and paraconsistent character of mbC. In our games, we allow
more than one player to have the same role.
We can now formally dene the verication game G for mbC.
Denition 3.1. A mbC verication game is a tuple G = (Π, Σ, ρ) where Π is the
set of players verier V and falsier F, Σ is the set of positions and ρ is the set of
well-dened game rules.
A specic play ofG onM for a formulaφ ∈ L is denoted byG (M,φ). Similarly, the
set of positions Σφ in G (M,φ) is restricted to the subformulas Sub(φ) of φ. Precisely,
Σφ = {(pi ,ψ ) : pi ∈ Π,ψ ∈ Sub(φ)}. Which player pi with what role is associated to
which subformulaψ is determined by the game rules following the standard method-
ology of classical game semantics.
tional terminology with a twist towards our goal of establishing paraconsistent game theory. e winning
strategies in semantics games for non-classical logics are constructed based on the winning conditions in
such games, which can be non-classical logically.
5is certainly requires a dierent, perhaps non-biconditional, correctness theorem for the game se-
mantics of such systems. For certain examples of such games and logics, we refer the reader to (Bas¸kent,
2016).
6is is the point where wins are dened reecting the behavior of negation. e winning conditions
in classical logics necessarily require win/lose games. However, if “truth in a model” is dened paracon-
sistently, then more than one player may have wins, depending on the model theory of the paraconsistent
logic in question. Consequently, winning strategies are dened based on such a denition of wins and
constructed for games that are not necessarily win/lose games — as we have done. Nevertheless, as we
mentioned earlier, we stick to the traditional terminology in this work in order to prevent an ination
in terminology and also to underline the fact that the concepts in semantic games for classical logics are
degenerate cases of those in semantic games for paraconsistent logics.
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Now, our main task is to give the game rules ρ for G. ese rules will be dened
as transformations from a game position (pi ,φ) to a set of positions {(pi ′,ψ )} where
pi ′ ∈ Π andψ is a subformula of φ dened in the standard way.
e game rules ρ for semantic games for mbC are given as follows based on the
players’ current roles. Similar to many other semantic games, distribution of roles
(verier, falsier etc.) may change throughout the game in mbC verication games.
(ρGp ) If the current formula is p for p ∈ P , the current verier wins if p is true and the
current falsier wins if p is false,
(ρG¬ ) If the current formula is ¬φ, then the current falsier becomes the verier, and
the current verier becomes both the verier and the falsier, and the game
continues with φ with roles switched,
(ρG◦ ) If the current formula is ◦φ, then the game continues with φ and ¬φ with play-
ers’ roles switched,
(ρG→) If the current formula is φ → ψ , then the current verier makes a choice be-
tween ¬φ andψ ,
(ρG∧ ) If the current formula is φ∧ψ , then the current falsier makes a choice between
φ andψ ,
(ρG∨ ) If the current formula is φ∨ψ , then the current verier makes a choice between
φ andψ .
Game rules specify which moves are allowed when a game is in a certain position
and which players make moves. It is important to notice that the rules are given for
the current roles of the players. During the game players may switch roles back and
forth multiple times. For example, the falsier can start the game as F, can continue
as Fv as a verier, and terminate the game as Fv,f where he can end up admiing both
roles. In that respect, simply put, the game rules are given for the “subscripts” of the
players, which indicate the current role of the player.7
e set of game rules ρ follows closely the tableaux rules for mbC (Carnielli et al.,
2007). It also reects our reading of non-determinism.8
Let us now see some examples. We start with negation.
7It is oen found counter-intuitive that the players and roles are switched throughout semantic games.
Even if it is an entirely dierent discussion which falls outside the scope of this paper, there is a simple
solution. For any given formula φ , it is possible to play semantic games for the negation normal form of φ .
In this way, the role distribution for the game takes place at the beginning and does not change during the
game. e downside of this methodology is that, syntactically, the play for φ and its (logically equivalent)
negation normal form are not necessarily identical. Moreover, not all non-classical logics satisfy the De
Morgan principles, thus may not admit a negation normal form (Ferguson, 2012).
8is is indeed one of the tableaux rules for mbC where we have the following.
T(φ ) | F(φ )
is rule is necessary for the tableau to close. Our game rules admit no corresponding rule, and this is what
leads to both players having winning strategies for certain formulas.
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Example 3.2. Consider ¬p for propositional variable p. Let us see how game theo-
retical semantics works in this case.
If p is true, then the truth value of ¬p is undetermined and can be either. us, we
expect both players to have winning strategies. is is indeed the case as both Vv,f
and Fv wins when p is true.
¬p
Vv,f vs Fv
p
On the other hand, if p is false only
the falsier, that isVv,f, will win the game.
us, she will win the game for ¬p as the
negation of a true formula is determinis-
tically false in mbC.
Example 3.3. Let us consider the game for ¬¬p and see how game theoretical se-
mantics works in this game.
¬¬p
Vv,f vs Fv
¬p
Vv,f vs Fv,f
p
In this case, various unusual valuation
may appear. For example, if all p, ¬p and
¬¬p are true, then the verier still wins
the game for ¬¬p. If ¬¬p is false, but ¬p
and p are true, the falsier still has a win-
ning strategy for the game for ¬¬p as the
game tree demonstrates.
e analysis of other cases easily fol-
lows from the game tree.
Example 3.4. Let us consider the case ◦p.
◦p
Fv vs Vf
p
Fv vs Vf
¬p
Fv,f vs Vv
p
An interesting case is where both p
and ¬p are true, but ◦p is false. In this
case, as expected, on the le-hand side
branch Fv has a winning strategy, yield-
ing a winning strategy for F for the for-
mula ◦p. On the right-hand side branch,
F has a winning strategy, too - rst mak-
ing a move as Fv and as Fv,f.
Example 3.5. Let us consider the case p ∧ ¬p.
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p ∧ ¬p
F
p ¬p
Vv,f vs Fv
p
e only interesting case is where
both p and ¬p are true, yielding p ∧ ¬p
true.
In this game, F loses immediately if
he chooses p. If he chooses ¬p, then Vv,f
makes a choice and wins the game for
p ∧ ¬p. Additionally, the falsier makes
a move as Fv and wins. In this game, both
players have winning strategies.
Example 3.6. Let us consider the case p → q. e problematic case in mbC is when
both p and ¬p are true, and q is false. In this case, the conditional p → q is false.
p → q
V
¬p
Vv,f vs Fv
p
q
In this case, we will show that F has a
winning strategy.
If V chooses q, which is false, then F
wins.
If V chooses ¬p, then the game con-
tinues with p with the playersVv,f and Fv,
where F wins again.
Since the game is not assumed to be
zero-sum, V can win as well.
As the examples indicate, the existence of multiple winning strategies does not
conclusively determine the truth value of the formula in question. is is simply a
reection of the truth conditions of mbC, and separates mbC games from many other
non-classical logical semantics games studied in (Bas¸kent, 2016).
We can now give the correctness theorem for the game semantics for mbC.
eorem 3.7. In an mbC game G (M,φ) for a modelM and a well-dened formula φ,
• e verier has a winning strategy if φ is true,
• e falsier has a winning strategy if φ is false.
Proof. e proof is by induction on the complexity of φ.
Case 1: Propositional Atoms
e case for the propositional atoms is identical to the classical case and follows
from the game rules.
Case 2: Negation
Let φ be ¬ψ for some formula ψ , and assume that ¬ψ is true. We will show that
the verier V has a winning strategy in G (M,¬ψ ). By the game rule (ρG¬ ), we have
Vv,f and Fv inG (M,ψ ). According to the truth table for mbC, if ¬ψ is true, thenψ can
be either true or false. us, in each case, Vv,f can win the gameG (M,ψ ), and he is the
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only player who can do that according to the game rules and win the game in each
case. en, in G (M,φ), V simply follows the rule and plays his strategy in G (M,ψ ).
is constitutes his winning strategy in G (M,φ).
is was the proof for the verier, let us now see how the proof works for the
falsier F. e key observation here is the fact that in mbC, if ¬ψ is false, thenψ must
be true (as opposed to undetermined).
Let ¬ψ be false. We will try to show that the falsier F has a winning strategy in
G (M,¬ψ ). Now, by the truth table,ψ must be true. InG (M,ψ ), we have Fv and Vv,f as
players. By the induction hypothesis, veriers have winning strategies. e player Fv
is one of the veriers. Since Fv has a winning strategy in G (M,ψ ), she has a winning
strategy in G (M,¬ψ ) - she simply follows the game rule (ρG¬ ) and makes a move as a
verier in G (M,ψ ). Notice that the player Vv,f also admits a verier role in G (M,ψ ),
but this does not exclude the player Fv admiing a winning strategy as we did not
assume that the verication game is zero-sum.
is concludes the proof for negation.
Case 3: Consistency Operator
Let φ be ◦ψ for someψ . We start with the case for the verier.
Let us assume that ◦ψ is true to show that the verier V has a winning strategy
in the game G (M, ◦ψ ). Now, by the truth table, eitherψ or ¬ψ is false - not both, not
neither. Without loss of generality, assume it is ψ . us, F has a winning strategy in
the gameG (M,ψ ). en, by rule (ρG◦ ),V has a winning strategy in the gameG (M, ◦ψ ),
hence in G (M,φ).
Let us now see the case for the falsier F. Let us assume that ◦ψ is false. en
at least one of ψ and ¬ψ is true. By the induction hypothesis, the verier in G (M,ψ )
or G (M,¬ψ ) has a winning strategy. us, by rule (ρG◦ ), the falsier F has a winning
strategy in G (M, ◦ψ ) - hence in G (M,φ).
Cases 4 & 5 & 6: Conditional, Conjunction and Disjunction
e cases for conditional, conjunction and disjunction are skipped as they are
identical to the classical cases.
is concludes the proof. 
e proof shows that in the semantic games formbC, one player’s loss or win does
not guarantee the opponent’s win or loss. It further claries the game theoretical
reading of non-determinism. In this approach, non-determinism can be viewed as
super-strategizing where strategies include all choices.
e converse of the eorem 3.7 is not true. Because in some games players may
admit multiple roles. As the rule (ρG¬ ) shows, the verier can admit both roles in a
play, reecting the non-deterministic character of the game. erefore, the existence
of the winning strategies does not determine the truth value as a player may admit
winning strategies for both roles.
Moreover, the converse of eorem 3.7 cannot be established by imposing various
further restrictions on the existence of winning strategies, including those mentioned
in an earlier paper (Bas¸kent, 2016). In (Bas¸kent, 2016), for example, the converse state-
ments of the correctness theorems for some logics were given by imposing “unique-
ness” conditions on the existence of winning strategies for certain players. For in-
stance, it was stated that if only the player, whose current role is to force the game
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to an end with the paraconsistent truth value P in Priest/Asenjo’s Logic of Paradox,
has a winning strategy in the verication game, then the truth value of the formula
in question has to be P . is methodology, however, does not work in mbC. In order
to see this, assume that in a game G (M,¬ψ ) only the falsier has a winning strategy.
en, the game continues with G (M,ψ ) where we have the players as Fv and Vv,f.
at is, the falsier admits the role of a verier. Yet, the verier also admits the role of
a verier (in addition to its falsier role) inG (M,ψ ). erefore, the idea of “imposing
the uniqueness of the falsier’s winning strategy to obtain a unique truth value for
the formula” collapses. If both players have the same role, whose role will determine
the actual truth value of the formula?
We proceed with the following results.
Corollary 3.8. AmbC gameG (M,¬φ) for a modelM and a well-dened negation-free
formula φ may not be won by only one player.
Proof. Consider the situation where φ is true, rendering its negation undetermined.
In this case, both players have winning strategies. 
Notice that the existence of winning strategies for both players does not refute
eorem 3.7.
Corollary 3.9. In a mbC game G (M,φ) for a model M and a well-dened formula φ,
both players can win the game. But, it is not possible that both can lose the game.
Proof. e result directly follows from the game rules. 
e above result establishes that the semantic games for mbC are not zero-sum.
From a game theoretical perspective, it suggests a direct connection between certain
bivaluations and the “number” of winners in certain games.
4 Discussion: Pragmatics ofGame Semantics formbC
e most obviously distinctive feature of game-theoretical semantics is that it pos-
tulates an interactive and dialogical argumentative situation, as opposed to the es-
sentially monological form of discourse of mathematical proofs (Rahman & Carnielli,
2000). Game-theoretical semantics, therefore, allows for actual conceptualization of
truth and falsity as features of certain well-dened interactive situations - namely, the
existence of winning strategies. en, pragmatically, for which discursive situations,
if any, do semantic games stand?
is dynamics clearly resembles a debate of sorts. In a debate, or at least in one
in which truthful discourse is to be expected, the person who makes a claim is bound
to stand for it, eectively commiing to its truth, and whoever objects to the claim
commits to its falsity; and, of course, usually both parties also want to be right and,
thus, win the debate.
Similarly, in semantics games, by commiing to the truth (or falsity) of φ, a player,
if coherent, implicitly assumes certain other commitments which are determined by
the subformulas of φ. Classically, for example, if φ is a conjunctive formula α ∧ β ,
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then, since it is necessary for the truth of α ∧ β that both α and β be true, the one
who commits to the truth of φ -the verier- implicitly commits to the truth of both α
and β , while the one who commits to the falsity of φ -the falsier-, needs to commit
to the falsity of only one of them. Since, however, her pragmatic commitments do not
tell him to which of α and β to commit, the falsier may do so as he prefers.
Notice, however, that the relevant form of commitment here is pragmatic, and not
epistemic. In a debate one may just as well stand for something they don’t believe - in-
deed, lawyers do this sort of thing all the time. We may say, with Brandom (Brandom,
1994), that rational debate is a maer of what claims one is entitled to - as opposed
to the beliefs one actually holds in private. Classically, if one wants to claim that φ,
and even more so if one does not share any assumptions with the interlocutor from
which the formula could be justied inferentially, then there is no way around it but
to dispute that entitlement (and win). Ultimately, this is to say that one must have a
winning strategy as the verier in the semantic game for a formula in order to be sure
to be entitled to claim it. In a sense, thus, semantic games simply spell out the rules
of propositional entitlement.
is being so, we may ask: how does semantics games for mbC contribute to the
discussions about the pragmatics of LFIs, especially considering its non-deterministic
aspect?
What is interesting about mbC (and LFIs in general) is that, unlike Asenjo’s and
Priest’s LP, for example, they are paraconsistent logics which do have the means to
force contrariety of a formula φ and its negation, thus recovering classicality. Indeed,
this is the very upshot of adding a consistency operator to the object language. When
one is not sure of the consistency of φ, however, ¬φ may be compatible with both φ
being true and it being false. It thus follows, in particular, that there are some cases
in which one needs not (as would be the case in classical logic) be entitled to object
to φ in order to be entitled to claim that ¬φ.
As expected, the proposed game semantics for mbC mimics this behaviour by
making it at least possible for the verier of ¬φ to win (and, indeed, also have a win-
ning strategy), whether or not the falsier has a winning strategy. Now by going back
to pragmatics, we see that mbC and other LFIs would be most properly conceived
as modelling standards of inference of situations in which opposing parties may be
equally entitled to prima facie incompatible claims. is is precisely what is to be
expected of situations in which the agent’s assessment of the truth of falsity of the
claims is to be bounded by currently available evidential support. In such a situation,
the one who is commied to the truth of an actually true proposition, for example,
may nevertheless be no more (nor less) entitled to claim it than her opponent in the
dispute, if the available evidential support is not decisive.
In general, this seems to imply that non-determinism in the semantics of a para-
consistent logic is beer understood in its potential relation to epistemic game theory,
particularly to informationally bounded rationality. As the term itself suggests, non-
determinism in games relates directly to how game theoretical rationality is conceived
with its relation to information. In long term, this suggests that the connections be-
tween LFIs and game theory are far more reaching than previously envisioned. On
the one hand, one of the most central challenges presented to game theory today is
imperfect information games and how they related to rationality and game theoretical
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equilibria (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994); and LFIs may be just the logical tools needed
to aid game theory in such a task, by providing it with a systematic way of approach-
ing informational constraints. On the other hand, dierent informational constraints,
motivated by various game theoretical situations, would provide philosophical in-
terpretations (and, more importantly, applications) for a variety of LFIs. is would
ground LFIs and at the same time present a non-classical logical connection to game
theory.
We started our discussion of game semantics for mbC with an analogy between
non-determinism in program runs and non-determinism in truth values. is, how-
ever, turns out to be more than an analogy.
From a computational perspective, the game semantics for mbC is signicant and
contributes to the discussion regarding the constructive nature of proofs. If proofs
are considered as realization of winning strategies, and if the truth is identied by
(the existence) proofs, non-determinism simply builds upon this connection. In mbC-
games, it is then possible to view the existence of winning strategies as proofs for
non-deterministic truth. erefore, it remains as a task for future work whether
this connection can be extended to various major discussions in computational logic,
including non-deterministic automata and P vs NP problem. By introducing non-
determinism to semantic games, thus to proofs, we take a small steps towards under-
standing the logical foundations of non-determinism in computation in general. From
a pragmatics point of view, this simply shows us whether computational choices can
be seen as pragmatic choices and vice versa. e pragmatic connection between com-
putation, games and non-determinism falls beyond the scope of this paper, and we
leave this discussion to future work.
5 Further Observations
e computational approach to mbC is more than an analogy. It suggest further con-
nections between pragmatically motivated philosophical approaches and game theo-
retical analysis of mbC. Following the computational path, we suggest handling non-
determinism using a well-known concept in computability theory. Next, following the
game theoretical path, we relate mbC games to logical dependancy. Logical depen-
dency is a central concept in logic of games and it can be used to formalize imperfect
information games.
5.1 Oracle
An oracle is a know-it-all meta-player that can be asked any question and answers
truthfully. For that reason, he can be viewed as a consistency-checker, where he simply
answers for which formula φ, ◦φ is true. With an oracle, it is then possible to reduce
mbC gamesG (M,φ) to classical games where ◦φ holds. However, if the oracle answers
negatively about the truth of ◦φ, then the game continues as before. Our aim is to
suggest a computational tool which can express the gentle explosion in mbC using
game semantics.
e new game rules are given as follows for semantic games with oracles.
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(ρ¯Gp ) If the current formula is p for p ∈ P and ◦p is true, then the verier wins if p is
true and the falsier wins if p is false,
(ρ¯G¬ ) If the current formula is ¬φ and ◦φ is true, then the game continues with φ with
players switching roles,
(ρ¯G◦ ) If the current formula is ◦φ and if ◦φ is true, the game continues with φ.
e rules for conjunction, disjunction and conditional remain the same.
e semantic games where the oracle answers each question armatively is called
a verication game with an oracle, and denoted by G (M,φ) for a given formula φ ∈ L
and a model M . ose are the games that benet fully from an oracle. In such games,
we have a stronger correctness theorem.
eorem 5.1. In a mbC verication game G (M,φ) with an oracle in a model M for a
given formula φ ∈ L,
• e verier has a winning strategy if and only if φ is true,
• e falsier has a winning strategy if and only if φ is false.
Proof. e proof is by induction on the complexity of φ.
Case 1: Propositional Atoms
If for a p ∈ P , we have ◦p true, then by the truth table p and ¬p cannot both be
true. en, the game is classical and the classical winning conditions apply, hence the
result follows.
Case 2: Negation
Similarly, in this case, according to the truth table in Table 1, the game reduces to
the classical case and the classical game rules apply, and the result follows.
Case 3: Consistency Operator
is case shows the over-reaching strength of the oracle.
If forφ = ◦ψ for someψ and ◦ψ is true, then the game continues withψ classically.
What we learn from the oracle is that ψ behaves classically, so is φ. As such, the
operator ◦ becomes redundant. e game continues withψ classically.
Cases 4 & 5 & 6: Conditional, Conjunction and Disjunction
Follows immediately using the classical truth conditions.
is concludes the proof. 
e immediate gain for introducing an oracle is regaining the zero-sumness of the
verication game.
Corollary 5.2. mbC verication games with oracles are zero-sum.
It is important to notice that the oracle is a meta-player, it does not admit winning
conditions and cannot win the game, but it partially resolves the non-determinacy of
the truth values in some cases.
As we mentioned, the new game rules ρ¯ can be seen as too strong. ere are cases
where a formula φ behaves classically but ◦φ is not true. is is indeed a justied
criticism. e new game rules allow the oracle to overplay his hand and reduce the
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game to a simple sub-game where the biconditional correctness theorem can easily
be recovered. is is a reection of the truth table for mbC.
In LFIs, the meta-logical consistency property is brought down to the object level
by the ◦ operator. e oracle is dened on this observation: it answers meta-logical
questions and communicates the answer in the object level. It is easy to see that dif-
ferent oracles could be implemented for the non-classical connectives in mbC. For
example, it is possible to dene an oracle that can answer questions about the con-
sistency of {φ,¬φ} with the aim of resolving the truth value of the negation. Such
extensions are important as they beg further computational questions: What is the
minimum number of oracles necessary in order to obtain a biconditional correctness
theorem for a given LFI? How can we reduce dierent LFIs to each other using oracles?
Such questions are interesting and point out various further research opportunities,
motivated by the game semantics.
Our oracle is omniscient. It is possible to consider another oracle who is omnipo-
tent. e omnipotent oracle can have the power of turning the mbC formulas φ into
classical ones by ensuring that ◦φ is satised for such φ.
Furthermore, the oracle is a know-it-all player. en, the immediate question is
how the oracle plays in imperfect information games, which can possibly be formal-
ized by semantic games for mbC. In such a case, the role of the oracle crystallizes the
epistemic aspects of the game.
In conclusion, the introduction of oracles to semantic games suggests an alterna-
tive approach to understand the relation between LFIs and classical logics. In addition
to semantical, proof-theoretical and algebraic methods which are suggested to ana-
lyze this relation, our contribution broadens the discussion to a computational and
epistemic framework. is should be seen as another step towards understanding the
connection between proofs, game semantics, non-classical logics and strategies.
5.2 Dependence
Another direction to extend the framework we have introduced is to consider a rela-
tively recent body of work which focuses on dependence and independence of quan-
tiers (Mann et al., 2011; Va¨a¨na¨nen, 2007). ese logics introduce the idea that in a
game, sometimes a player’s move may or may not depend on the opponent’s prior
moves. e quantier dependence henceforth can be viewed as a game from this
perspective.
It is possible to take another step towards this conceptual direction and discuss
dependency of truth-values within the context of LFIs, dierent from how depen-
dency is discussed in IF logic. e truth value of a composite formula in some cases
does and in some cases does not, depend on the truth value of its consistency. Such a
dependence requires considering the negation of the formula in question. Simply put,
the truth value of ¬p does not depend on the truth value of ◦p if p is false. However,
it does depend on the truth value of ◦p when ◦p is false. Moreover, when the truth
value of ¬p does not depend on the truth value of ◦p when p is true, then it can be
deduced that ¬p is false.
As we have observed in the proof of the Correctness eorem (eorem 3.7), some
truth values non-deterministically create dependency. For example, if a negation ¬p
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is false, then due to the semantics of mbC, ¬p cannot be only false, it must be non-
deterministically false. In this case, we observe that the existence of a winning strat-
egy for the verier depends on the existence of a winning strategy for the falsier
in G (M,¬p). is is an original approach to the dependency of winning strategies
in verication games and suggests a complex way to strategize for the players. We
summarize these observations briey as follows.
Proposition 5.3. In a mbC verication game, the existence of a winning strategy for
one player may depend on the existence of a winning strategy for the opponent in some
subgames.
Notice that the above proposition is another way to conclude that the semantic
games for mbC are not zero-sum but positive-sum.
Proposition 5.4. e verication game for mbC is a non-negative sum game.
erefore, the game rules and the dependence of strategies both suggest that the
semantic games for mbC are constant-sum. What is le is to extend this approach
to a broader context where strategy dependence and its relation to underlying logic
(whether it is mbC or some other LFI) is studied. at is for future work.
6 Conclusion
Non-determinism is not a very intuitive concept neither for theories of truth nor for
game theory. Coupled with paraconsistency, it becomes even more complex. Game
semantics aims at clarifying this issue. It explains how non-determinism works, how
it should be understood and how it relates to other computational concepts and games,
such as oracles and imperfect games. is provides further evidence to the connection
between proofs, winning strategies and truth.
What we achieved in this work, motivated by various computational notions and
logics, is to introduce non-determinism to Hintikkan semantic games and present a
new semantics for LFIs. Consequently, we established a grounded application of non-
determinism in propositional dynamic logic in semantic games, and used a know-it-all
meta-player, the oracle, to normalize the semantic games. Both of these directions are
promising, relating a broader class of games and logics.
LFIs form a broad category of logics. In this work, we focused on one of the min-
imal LFIs. What remains to be done is to extend the current work to other LFIs in
a systematic way. One way is to consider the distribution of roles as suggested by
the negation operator. In our system, negation introduces a second role for the veri-
er. Considering various alternatives for the distribution of roles over players under
negation suggests a procedural way to extend the game semantics we have developed
to some other logics within the LFI system. Furthermore, it also oers a way to “de-
velop” logics based on game rules without focusing on the truth table rst. Another
line for future work is to extend the game semantics to other non-deterministic logics
via quasi-matricies and swap structures (Avron & Zamansky, 2011). We leave such
generalization for future work.
18
e remarks we presented on the pragmatics of game semantics easily carry over
to various neighboring elds of game theory, including social choice theory and wel-
fare theory. Social choice theory, in particular, has been shaped by impossibility re-
sults and paradoxes. is presents immense opportunities to apply paraconsistent
game theory to the impossibility results in social choice theory. An inquiry regarding
the possible applications of LFIs in social choice theory as well as seeking solutions
from LFIs for the classical problems of the theory remains as valid direction for further
study.
Game semantics for logics are not necessarily unique. Seen as mathematical ob-
jects, game equivalence is not an easy concept to dene. What follows from this obser-
vation is that there can exist various other semantic games for mbC which potentially
treat the consistency operator and negation dierently using alternative game theo-
retical notions. It is our aim that the current work stimulates such developments in
the areas of semantic games and non-classical logics.
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